Haaretz
Av 28, 5766
One of the main
conclusions of the war against Hezbollah will be the
fact that the
fighting abilities of the ground forces deployed by the Israel Defense
Forces in Lebanon have been blunted by years of police action in the
territories.
Most units, in their training and operations, followed
fighting doctrines of police forces and not of standing armies. Hezbollah
trains, fights and is equiped as an army, utilizing some of the most
advanced anti-tank missiles and other weapons.
The character of the
IDF - known for its blitzkrieg methods, encircling
movements deep
inside enemy territory, and the ability to bring about a quick and
decisive conclusion to the fighting - has been spoiled by years of
involvement in operations that tied it down, emotionally and politically.
This included missions to stop terrorist cells, dealing with
suicide bombings, the use of light weapons for the most part, and closures
and sieges imposed on large population centers. Many of the IDF's
reservists operate alongside the Shin Bet security service personnel to
carry out arrests of wanted Palestinians. Battalions of reservists stood
guard over Palestinians in detention centers.
In many ways, the IDF
became the standing army of the Shin Bet. This is not the army that Israel
knew in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 or the 1982 Lebanon War, which were
both followed by a public commission of inquiry. Many of the advantages
and operational qualities of the IDF have been lost over the years because
the army has been fighting the wrong war from a military point of
view.
It would have been better, for example, had the war against
the Palestinians been handled by the Border Police, allowing the regular
army and its reservists to train for a different type of
warfare.
It turns out that many of the commanders in Lebanon
learned their trade in the fighting in the territories, and they thought
in terms of fighting the Palestinians. The "Palestinian model" guided the
way IDF units fought the bloody battles at Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbail.
The units entered the battle and withdrew, similar to the way they operate
in the Gaza Strip.
The IDF was also surprised in Lebanon by the
amount of anti-tank missiles
fired by Hezbollah. The immediate
reaction in the territories is to take cover in the closest home. In
Lebanon, many soldiers were killed when anti-tank missiles penetrated
walls behind which IDF troops had taken cover. Two weeks into the
fighting, a specific order went out on how and where to take
cover.
In Lebanon, soldiers fought in bunkers just like the
Americans in Vietnam. A Hezbollah prisoner, who was part of an anti-tank
missile team, said that during their training, they were allowed to fire
as many as 15 anti-tank missiles. These are very costly, and the IDF
doesn't even dream of such training, even though the experience is
invaluable.
Another example is the deployment of the Golani Brigade
from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon. It turns out that this excellent fighting
force lacked officer expertise in coordinating with artillery batteries,
something that they don't have to do very often in their policing
duties.