Haaretz
Nisan 5, 5765
In Texas on Monday, George W. Bush and Ariel
Sharon marked out the furthest borders that any Israeli prime minister can
dream of: at most - and even that is not without conditions and not
necessarily so - they will be the eastern line around the major Israeli
population centers (settlement blocs) in the territories, including - by
implication - the post-1967 Jerusalem neighborhoods.
It's doubtful
Israel will ever find a friendlier president than Bush, and one more
combative toward its enemies. If he drew that line, for his guest Sharon
and the world watching them, it means that any campaign to save dozens of
settlements and tens of thousands of settlers who are outside that line is
doomed from the start. Many Israelis, who have long hoped for a compromise
based on the 1967 lines, won't regard that as a defeat, but just the
opposite. But others, including those who have been in power for years or
on the rightist flanks that made things difficult for governments, play
with the delusion of holding onto all the settlements of the West
Bank.
Until recently, Sharon was among them. The far-reaching
implication of the statements made at the president's ranch was that now
Sharon has adopted Bush's territorial vision. "Israel's position," the
prime minister announced festively, is that the blocs will remain in
Israel's hands in any future arrangement. Therefore, when the time comes,
the dispute that emerged from the statements by the two will be about the
definitions and sizes of those blocs. Bush followed reality and successive
Israeli governments since Yitzhak Rabin, who recognized that a Palestinian
state will succeed the Jordanian kingdom as the authority in the West
Bank. He also referred to another element of reality, the population
centers, but with a significant reservation: there is an American
position, but any changes to the 1967 lines require agreement by both
sides.
Another important message - and a welcome one at that -
which was clearly enunciated in what the president said, was his
determination to continue efforts to fulfill his Middle East vision. Bush
reiterated and emphasized his support for his guest's plan to disengage
from Gaza. However, he made clear that he will regard completion of that
move - which he rightly called daring - as Israeli progress on the road
map, which is supposed to lead the parties toward fulfillment of his
vision.
Bush made sure to note that Sharon is going to conduct the
disengagement "in coordination with the Palestinian Authority or without
it." He called on the PA to coordinate with the Israelis. In their working
session, it has been reported, much of the time was spent examining ways
to fortify the PA and strengthen the position of Abu Mazen. Bush thinks
Abu Mazen's greatest test will come after the Israeli withdrawal, when he
will be forced to prove that the PA is able to impose security worthy of
its name on the Gaza Strip and to conduct normal civic life
there.
From Bush's statement it is clear that there is a connection
between tactic and strategy in American policy. The final goal is to
achieve an agreement between the sides, and movement toward that goal will
proceed according to the road map. Israel's first step is evacuating Gaza
and the northern Samaria area. The first Palestinian step is a constant,
thorough and effective campaign against terror. Bush dictated to Sharon
some commandments of the "thou shalt not" variety: do not expand
settlements, do not leave the outposts in place and do not beef up
existing settlements.