Haaretz
Adar 14, 5767
North Korea's agreement to give
up its military nuclear program was a huge success for the international
community. Admittedly, the country's dire economic condition and its
urgent need for energy made the agreement venal in a way. But North
Korea's decision nonetheless demonstrated the virtues and efficacy of
diplomacy, which brings us once again to the case of Iran.
French
President Jacques Chirac recently implied that we should not overestimate
the seriousness of Iran's possessing nuclear weapons. I disagree. It is
true that possessing such weapons does not mean using them, that for 15
years the world has had eight nuclear powers and that nuclear force has
not been used since 1945. But it is also true that Iran's emergence as the
ninth nuclear power would provoke a regional and global upheaval,
dangerously aggravate fears and suspicions and confront the international
community with a profound crisis of vision and policy.
So, what
can we do? First, resorting to force is simply not realistic. A nuclear
strike would have incalculable consequences, and the Muslim world would in
this case stand together. Nor is a conventional attack possible, as Israel
has no common border with Iran and most of the American army is tied up in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is therefore absolutely necessary to
explore diplomatic avenues. Their success would be guaranteed if the
international community, especially the United States, clearly understands
and admits their necessity, and supports them firmly and completely. For
example, economic sanctions, to which Iran is very sensitive, could be
tightened, with a commitment not to resort to military force, thus
facilitating Russian and Chinese approval.
The only possible
framework for negotiations is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
concluded in 1968. Iran was one of the first countries to sign and it
cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for more
than 30 years - a relationship that deteriorated only in the last three
years. But the current climate of mutual wariness between Iran and the
self-proclaimed triad of Germany, Great Britain and France (with sporadic
U.S. support) is not propitious to effective negotiations.
The
West's aim, announced by the U.S. and adhered to by the triad, is to force
Iran to give up uranium enrichment. Yet the NPT is clear: Any signatory
that gives up nuclear weapons and accepts the IAEA's absolute and
unconditional control is entitled to produce electric energy from civil
nuclear sources, and to receive technical and financial support from the
international community, if necessary. Iran's oil resources are not
infinite and it wants to have complete control over the civil nuclear
field - a basic right as an NPT signatory.
I cannot see how a
negotiation aimed at getting Iran to unilaterally renounce a right
recognized for all NPT signatories simply in order to build confidence in
the West could be successful. Uranium enrichment is certainly the first
condition for making bombs, but the level of enrichment must reach about
95 percent, compared to the 3.5 percent needed for energy production.
Are the international scientific community and the IAEA really
incapable of providing indicators and criteria that would allow the
international community to differentiate between two types of industrial
operations? For example, forty years ago, when fear of nuclear
proliferation was new, my teacher and friend Vassili Leontief, who
invented the macroeconomic table of inter-industrial flows, argued that
the best indicator of an illegal arms program is massive electricity
consumption.
The Iranian government has never publicly expressed a
will to possess nuclear weapons. In fact, it has offered several times to
accept IAEA monitoring and has suggested that its civil nuclear program
would be carried out with international cooperation.
So far, the
West has rejected everything, on the pretext that any uranium enrichment
would indicate a military program. Although this stance is technically
wrong, it is strategically rational, given the West's wariness regarding
Iran's true intentions.
I recently met in Paris with Iran's
ambassador to France and I began our encounter brusquely: "So, you really
want this bomb, Ambassador?" His answer deserves consideration. "Of course
not," he replied. "You know very well that the actual ambition of my
country is to achieve regional leadership. If we had the bomb, the
relationships with all our neighbors would immediately deteriorate."
As everybody knows, ambassadors are paid to lie. The West's
wariness is well-founded and we have no reason to renounce our mistrust.
But that should not prevent us from exploring all scenarios.
If we
interpret the NPT correctly, we can launch negotiations with Iran that
would quickly reveal the sincerity of its official stance.
Michel
Rocard, former prime minister of France and leader of the Socialist Party,
is a member of the European Parliament.