Haaretz
Tevet 10, 5767
If daily life in Iraq is
the criterion by which this question is answered, the execution of Saddam
has had no impact. On average, 60 people a day lose their life in Iraq,
and Saturday was no exception.
There are those who will draw a link
between the execution and acts of violence in the coming days, but it will
not be a very convincing argument, just as it has been difficult to
explain the violence since Saddam's fall as being related to the tyrant
himself in any way.
The fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 did not
create any natural alternative, or even any option that had legitimacy in
the eyes of a majority of Iraqis. The simplistic view that guided the
American administration - that the Shi'ites and Kurds would support the
American effort and the Sunnis would be crushed - failed.
What
Saddam seemed to know, the coalition forces could not see: Shi'ites, like
Sunnis, are not all the same, while the Kurds are a breed apart. Each
ethnic group is divided by different religious leaders, clan interests and
tribal leaders.
As a result, their shared hatred for Saddam -
genuine hate on which the coalition forces depended - was transformed into
a sectarian conflict. Dozens of groups, some with links to Al-Qaida,
others to Shi'ite or Sunni tribes, as well as dozens of criminal gangs,
took the place of Saddam's iron fist.
With its cruelty, Saddam's
regime created the semblance of a unified state and national sentiment. It
imposed a shared culture from the top, which was secular and based on
Iraq's ancient history. This state was viewed by the West, until the Gulf
War in 1991, as a defensive barrier against Iran.
The result is
that even the current coalition that comprises the elected Iraqi
government is unable to manage the state - and it is certainly incapable
of establishing a unified force, under one leadership, that is capable of
suppressing the violence. Every ministry has a small army; each local
leader has an armed unit and an independent arsenal; and the police forces
are infiltrated by terrorists. Thus even the sense of Arab or Islamic
unity that characterized Iraq has broken down, to the point that its own
new constitution questions its Arab character, since the Kurds are not
Arabs, and its Islamic identity is causing divisive arguments.
The
U.S. finds itself caught between the various domestic and regional
interests at play, lacking any clear direction other than a single
principle: that leaving Iraq would cause the state's
disintegration.
Lacking a political program, the American
administration is sending another 20,000 soldiers to Iraq. Unlike other
states, the superpower cannot allow itself to be defeated in Iraq. Its
deterrent power, which underlies its ability to influence the countries of
the region, has already been seriously undermined. Its political - not
military - ability to embark on another war, for example against Iran, is
questionable.
There still remains the question of the symbolism in
Saddam's execution. The Middle East has countless examples of regimes
overthrown on the promise of a better life. In most cases, the new regimes
consisted of locals who presented themselves as patriots, rising up to do
away with corrupt regimes linked to the West. That is how Saddam presented
himself.
The new Iraqi government, on the other hand, is viewed as
an American pawn. As such, Saddam may come to be remembered as an
authentic Iraqi leader - and thus his account with Bush would be
posthumously settled in his favor.