Haaretz
Cheshvan 23, 2004
In late October, 1964, Israel's prime
minister, Levi Eshkol, sent a message to the president of the United
States, Lyndon Johnson. The message included "a very personal and
informal" request to postpone the next visit of American government
officials to the nuclear reactor in Dimona. Eshkol asked to postpone the
visit until after the Knesset elections in November, 1965.
This
request is one expression of the dispute that had already begun over the
development of the Israeli nuclear project. One aspect of the dispute was
the pressure exerted by the U.S. to halt the project or to ensure American
supervision over it. Another aspect, an internal one, peaked in a harsh
disagreement between Eshkol and David Ben-Gurion, who had resigned from
the position of prime minister a year and a half earlier. Eshkol admitted
that he had committed to "seasonal supervision" of the reactor in Dimona,
but he feared that if he were compelled to fulfill this commitment, he
would come under fierce criticism by Ben-Gurion and the others who had
bolted Mapai to form the Rafi faction in the Knesset. Eshkol explained to
U.S. administration officials that Rafi's accusations against him would be
liable to hurt his political standing.
Eshkol's message to Johnson
appears in a U.S. State Department memorandum discovered by Dr. Zaki
Shalom, a senior researcher at Ben-Gurion University. Shalom is currently
publishing a study entitled "From Dimona to Washington" about the
relationship between Israel and the U.S. during the years 1960 through
1968, concerning the construction of the nuclear reactor in
Dimona.
"Eshkol's unusual request sent to the White House is also
one of the keys to the understandings that ultimately developed between
the U.S. and Israel with regard to continuation of the nuclear project,"
Shalom says.
In 1963, John F. Kennedy had already dropped his
intention of squashing the Israeli nuclear plan and adopted a policy of
keeping a low profile. This change, Shalom believes, was part of an
attempt to stabilize Eshkol's leadership at any cost. The American
administration's assessment was that it would be easier to discuss the
nuclear issue with Eshkol than with Ben-Gurion.
On the eve of the
Israeli elections in November, 1965, Shalom says, "Eshkol persuaded the
Americans that a blow to his political standing would bring Ben-Gurion
back to power. And there was nothing the American administration wanted
less than to see Ben-Gurion return as prime minister."
Shalom's
study of the argument between Jerusalem and Washington over the
development of Israel's nuclear capability is based entirely on documents
from official archives in the United States, England and Canada. The
documents clearly indicate that in 1963 the American administration had a
precise timetable on the Israeli nuclear program: Within six to eight
years Israel would conduct its first nuclear test and within 10 to 12
years - that is, 1973 to 1975 - Israel would have an appropriate nuclear
force.
In order to ensure the capability of independent launches,
Israel also began to develop - with the assistance of the French firm
Marcel Dassault - a two-stage, ground-to-ground Jericho missile, fueled by
solid propellant, with a range of about 500 kilometers and capable of
carrying nuclear warheads. The missiles developed in Israel were similar
to the American Pershing missiles. Based on information the American
intelligence branches had in 1963 and on memoranda the State Department
sent to President Kennedy, it appears that Israel decided to produce
between 200 and 300 missiles at a cost of $700,000 per
missile.
Shalom focuses on the enormous interest two Democratic
presidents in the 1960s - Kennedy and Johnson - showed in the Israeli
nuclear initiative. The book examines their activities regarding this
issue and the pressure they exerted to ensure that the reactor in Dimona
would be under close supervision. Israel had a ready answer to explain why
it was building a nuclear reactor - it was ostensibly intended to develop
energy for water desalination. But when questions were asked about missile
development, Israel stuttered and stammered.
Robert Komer, who
briefly served as Johnson's national security advisor in 1966, asked
during a discussion with the American president, "Why does Israel need to
spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a project that has little
[deterrent] benefit [as long as it carries only conventional warheads]?"
One can understand from this question that the U.S. believed the missiles
were intended to carry nuclear warheads. Myer "Mike" Feldman, a
presidential advisor from 1961 to 1965, pressed Eshkol to inform the U.S.
how many missiles Israel planned to produce. The memorandum in the State
Department archives reveals that the Israeli prime minister responded to
Feldman's prodding in the style of a Jewish shopkeeper: "Perhaps five
less, or more than 25, perhaps 10, 20 or 30."
Questions of
ambiguity
Some 40 years later, Israel is still concealing all
information about its nuclear capabilities, but an unforeseen breach has
been exposed. Though access to relevant archive documents is still blocked
in Israel, the U.S. is ignoring Israel's sensitivity regarding the nuclear
issue.
When Shalom began his research about four years ago, some of
the documents dealing with foreign relations from 1963 to 1967 were
declassified in the presidential archives of Kennedy and Johnson and in
the national archives of the U.S., Britain and Canada. Thus, a
considerable amount of material surfaced that documents conversations
between U.S. administration officials and Israeli government leaders about
the U.S. demand to halt the development of Israel's nuclear capacity and
allow full American supervision over the activities at the nuclear
facility in Dimona. These documents, now accessible to the general public,
document the most intimate conversations about the Israeli nuclear program
and raise questions about Israel's continued policy of ambiguity and
vagueness regarding its nuclear status.
Shalom's study reveals
that the U.S., Britain and Canada established a joint mechanism in Israel,
through their embassies, to collect information on the Israeli nuclear
program. The ambassadors and military attaches exchanged and compared
information about the Israeli program and sent reports back to their
governments. The government of Israel also used this mechanism, exploiting
it to send messages, sometimes as "trial balloons."
In February,
1961, the British ambassador in Israel raised a series of questions about
the Dimona project. The questions were passed on to Ben-Gurion, who
responded in a detailed letter that Israel harbored no intention of
producing nuclear arms. Nonetheless, he emphasized that Israel was
surrounded by hostile countries and that it would be difficult to assess
the future.
According to Shalom, "In these words, Ben-Gurion
officially raised the nuclear option as a possibility that Israel might
choose if certain changes take place in the diplomatic and strategic
reality in which it operates." Shalom says that Ben-Gurion "had no doubt
that this clarification would also be passed along to the American
administration. Nonetheless, it was comfortable for him at that stage to
gauge the anticipated response via the British government, without risking
a direct confrontation with the American administration."
Shalom
discovered the clarifications Ben-Gurion sent to the British ambassador in
a report written by the Canadian ambassador to Israel; he found this
report in the archives of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade. Ben-Gurion had already used this same tactic in a
meeting with Canada's prime minister, John Diefenbaker, the day before
meeting with President Kennedy on May 30, 1960. Ben-Gurion told
Diefenbaker that Israel was likely to build an experimental facility that
would produce a limited quantity of plutonium each year. This was a clear
hint that Israel planned to build the capacity for producing nuclear
weaponry.
"But," Shalom notes, "Diefenbaker did not fall off his
chair when he heard this, so Ben-Gurion could assume that his meeting with
President Kennedy would also be conducted in relative calm."
No
quick grab
The documents also indicate that the warnings
Ben-Gurion sounded in his talks with U.S. government officials about
Israel's susceptibility to sudden attack and destruction by Arab states
eventually fell upon attentive ears (though after he was no longer prime
minister). The U.S. government ultimately enabled Israel to develop the
nuclear option. One of Shalom's conclusions is that this nuclear
development was not the result of a quick grab by two or three Israeli
prime ministers. He presents the surprising conclusion that, due to U.S.
pressure on Israel, the decision-making process regarding the development
of nuclear capability was more open and democratic in Israel than in any
other country in the world.
The United States developed its
nuclear weapons in the secret Manhattan Project, and the citizens of the
U.S. and the world learned of the American nuclear project only after the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Israel, on the other hand, there
was intense public debate throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Shalom notes.
The argument over the logic of developing a nuclear capability took place
within the ruling party - Yigal Allon and Yisrael Galili were prominent
opponents - and in the academic world, and was widely reported in the
press.
Many publications have appeared in Israel and the world
about the development of the Israeli nuclear facility. In March 1965, The
New York Times reported that representatives of the U.S. administration
visited the Dimona reactor. This published report aroused a storm in
Israel. The Rafi faction, led by Ben-Gurion, accused Eshkol of
capitulating to American pressure. Eshkol's associates complained that the
American administration was responsible for leaking news of the Dimona
visit to the media. In their view, it proved that Israel could not place
complete faith in the administration's ability to be a full partner on
such a secret and sensitive issue as the nuclear project.
Israel
the poker player
Dr. Zaki Shalom's study appears four years
after the Hebrew publication of the controversial book by Dr. Avner Cohen,
"Israel and the Bomb," which deals with the development of Israel's
nuclear capability. Cohen's book was delayed for a long time due to
arguments raised by Yehiel Horev, the Defense Ministry's director of
security. Horev claimed that the book includes information that could harm
Israel's security.
Shalom's book does not deal with the development
of the nuclear project, but focuses on the construction of an Israeli
nuclear option. "What is exciting," Shalom says, "is the Israeli success
in creating an image of reliable deterrence without having to publicly
prove its nuclear capability. In this sense, Israel is similar to a poker
player who succeeds in creating the impression among the other players at
the table that he holds all of the winning cards, despite the fact that he
does not show them."