Haaretz
Shvat 6, 5767
An American in Iran? Sounds wild. A former
senior U.S. administration official? Can't be. So what would you say about
the fact that Iran, an evil country according to Bush, hosted such an
individual at the uranium conversion plant in Isfahan, at one of the
cornerstones of the Iranian nuclear program? In March 2006, at the height
of the nuclear crisis and a month after the matter was referred to the
United Nations Security Council, Dr. Gary Samore had the opportunity to
tour the facility, in which the first stage of the uranium enrichment
process takes place.
"I wasn't particularly impressed by their
capabilities. The Iranians don't have a reliable manufacturing
capability," he says during a break in the Herzliya Conference at the
Daniel Hotel, where he participated in a panel on "Coping with a
Nuclearizing Iran: Options for Prevention and Deterrence."
Samore
is a vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and
his name has been mentioned recently as a candidate for a senior position
in the next Democratic administration, if it comes to be. Samore was a
member of the National Security Council during the Clinton administration,
and the president's special envoy on proliferation issues.
In that
capacity, he launched a vigorous campaign against North Korea (which was
unsuccessful) to prevent Pyongyang from spreading missiles and missile
technology to the Middle East and particularly Iran. He also launched a
campaign against Russia (which was partially successful) to prevent Russia
from assisting the Iranian nuclear program. Samore visited Moscow numerous
times during that period, met with members of the Atomic Energy
Organizations of Russia, with senior officials of the Federal Security
Service there, provided them with intelligence on Russian companies and
research institutions that collaborated with Iran - he, in return,
received a promise that the matter would be dealt with. Sometimes the work
really did pay off, and the Russian authorities opened an investigation;
but sometimes they preferred to turn a blind eye.
Samore was also
responsible for the efforts to persuade China not to transfer nuclear
technology to Iran. The visit less than a year ago to Isfahan was, as far
as he was concerned, a kind of closing of the circle: The plans to build a
uranium conversion facility (in which natural uranium undergoes chemical
treatment and becomes gaseous uranium) in Isfahan were sold to Iran by
China. That was in 1991. China also signed a contract for around half a
billion dollars to build the plant, but "we exerted heavy pressure on
China and they cancelled it in 1997-98," stresses Samore.
Why did
China cave in to the pressure?
"The Chinese reached the conclusion
that Iran was trying to obtain nuclear weapons and didn't want to help
them to do so; a nuclear armed Iran is contrary to China's interests. They
also realized that the connection with Iran would affect their
relationship with the United States. Moreover we promised them that, in
return, we would supply them with our advanced nuclear power reactor." But
despite the cancellation of the contract (which caused financial loss to
China, which had to return the advance payment to Iran), the Iranians
managed to build the plant in Isfahan on their own by using the Chinese
blueprints. "From what I saw in Isfahan, I have the impression that most
of the construction is home-grown, although here and there, there is also
European-made equipment," says Samore.
'There won't be a bomb'
But the visit to Isfahan was not the only surprise awaiting
the American expert. He was also briefed by representatives of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran and met with former senior officials involved
in the nuclear program, including Hassan Ruhani, who was the secretary of
the Supreme National Security Council during the term of the previous
president, Mohammed Khatami. He heard half-hearted affirmation that Iran
was not settling only for a civilian nuclear program with peaceful aims.
If what he heard is correct, it stands in sharp contrast to Iran's public
declarations. "They told me, listen, we live in a dangerous neighborhood.
We are surrounded by neighbors with nuclear arms: Pakistan, India, Israel;
we are threatened. And therefore we need to have a nuclear option; believe
us, we will not produce a bomb."
Samore is not naive. He does not
really believe the Iranians. It is clear to him that they are striving to
obtain nuclear arms. The question is only do they have the capability?
This question is particularly essential because it would determine the
decision of whether to attack Iran to disrupt its nuclear program and
when.
Regarding capability, based on what he saw, heard and on his
knowledge, he estimates that Iran has encountered quite a few difficulties
in its efforts to master uranium enrichment technologies. Yet, he is not
willing to take the risk of estimating when Iran would have nuclear
weapons, if at all. The biggest mystery is whether Iran has a secret
program parallel to its official nuclear program. Samore believes that,
pending any dramatic surprises, Iran will not have nuclear weapons in the
coming years. His assessment contradicts Israeli intelligence estimates,
which talks about a "technological threshold" that Iran will probably
cross this year and of Iran being able to produce its first bomb in two to
three years.
Do you think Israel's leaders and officials are
alarmists?
"Yes, and I can also understand them. The U.S. is far
away, Europe is complacent and Russia may oppose the idea of nuclear
weapons in Iran, but doesn't see it as the end of the world. Clearly
Israel is the most worried. Both because of President Ahmadinejad's
declarations and because of the Holocaust. One has to take into account
that nuclear weapons in Iran will affect Israel's nuclear monopoly."
Dr. Robert Einhorn, also has difficulty estimating when Iran will
be able to produce nuclear weapons. Einhorn, like Samore, dealt with
proliferation issues in the Clinton administration and early in the Bush
administration. Samore was in the White House and Einhorn in the State
Department, where he reached served as assistant to the secretary of
state. Today he is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington. He, too, is mentioned as a candidate
for a senior post in the next administration if the Democrats win the
presidential election in 2008.
Like Samore, he does not rule out
the military option, but rather feels that it has to be the last resort.
Before then, all the other options of international pressure along with
sanctions against Iran need to be exhausted.
"The military option
should be discussed without emotions," he said in an interview during the
Herzliya Conference. "We need to consider a military strike in terms of
cost and benefits. It has to be considered whether it is possible to
strike all the targets, whether Iran has alternative sites, how long will
it take Iran to repair the damage and regenerate the program. If the
answer is 10 years, then it would be foolish of the president, any
president, Republican or Democratic, not to initiate an attack. But if a
military strike will delay the Iranian program for only 10 months, then
I'm not sure it's worthwhile."
Rational consideration
Perhaps it is a matter of ideology, or perhaps it is a matter
of nature, but contrary to his two colleagues, Richard Perle, another
participant in the Herzliya discussion, has no doubt that tough steps must
be taken against Iran. "I have no doubt," he stresses, "that if it becomes
apparent to President Bush that during his term Iran will achieve nuclear
weapons, he will not hesitate to order a strike." Perle, was an assistant
to then-secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger in the Reagan
administration, a consultant in then-president George H. Bush's
administration, and is an old friend of Vice President Dick Cheney and a
pillar of the neo-conservatives. "Don't get me wrong," he hurriedly adds,
"what I'm saying about President Bush and Iran does not stem from any
knowledge, I didn't discuss this with him; it is just an assessment based
on my acquaintance with him." (Samore feels that Bush will not be asked to
decide, because Iran will not acquire such capabilities during his term.)
If Bush orders a strike, will he do so out of religious
conviction?
"No way. It will have no connection to religious
belief; it will be solely the result of rational consideration. In my
opinion, there is a widespread misconception regarding this issue. People
think that after Iraq, President Bush, and basically any president, would
have a hard time acting against Iran. But in my assessment, there is broad
support among the American public for a tough policy against Iran. Nuclear
weapons in Iran's hands is a source of danger and a threat not only to
Israel, but also to all of us. The Iranians will provide more support for
terror organizations, dare more to challenge the U.S., become a hegemonic
power in the region and perhaps even share the nuclear knowledge with
terrorist organizations."
And if the U.S. doesn't strike, will
Israel have to do it?
"The Israeli consideration is very similar
to the American consideration. In principle, Israel has to take its own
independent decision, but the truth is that it will not be an independent
decision. The U.S. cannot afford for Israel to fail, if Israel decides to
strike. The U.S. supports an Israeli military operation and would even
embark on a similar parallel action."
And what about Israel's
military capabilities?
"Clearly the U.S. has better [military]
capabilities. We have B-2 bombers and stealth planes that can take off
from the U.S., attack one hundred targets simultaneously and destroy them,
and then return to the U.S. without the Iranians even knowing that they
had passed through their air space, without being detected on Iranian
radar screens. Israel does not have this capability."