The bombing raids on Afghanistan that began on 7 October marked the start of what the United States calls a war. This phase will test President George W Bush's initial strategic decisions. The Bush administration decided on its strategy during the three days following the 11 September attacks, filling in the details during a weekend of meetings at Camp David. Bush gave absolute priority to military action against Afghanistan, where the al-Qaida organisation and its leader, Osama bin Laden, are based. Bush's strategy had three stages: an ultimatum to the Taliban regime, the overthrow of the Taliban, and their replacement with a new power structure including Pashtuns. This government must be able to neutralise al-Qaida and, if possible, capture Bin Laden. The third stage covered military operations to instigate, speed up or complete a change of regime. The campaign in Afghanistan is only the first phase of a larger operation to eliminate international terrorism, but this is being delayed to avoid jeopardising the success of the attack on Afghanistan.
These decisions prompted an immediate controversy, which has not subsided. To understand why Bush committed himself to this strategy, we need to look at the balance of power in Washington. Secretary of State Colin Powell's part in the management of the present crisis has surprised many observers. His appointment last December was seen as an illustration of the racially and socially aware image that the new administration wanted but Bush in fact chose Powell to compensate for his own lack of international experience. He also needed someone who had little prior connection with the State Department so that he could be sure of exerting his authority. During the Gulf war in 1990-91, General Powell did not hesitate to counter the wishes of Bush Senior, demanding more time to assemble the forces required to defeat Iraq, even if this meant delaying operations till January 1991. Those who know him well often refer to him as a man with a rational mind (1).
But during his first eight months in office, Powell gave the impression that he had failed to assert his authority. Although he was an advocate of better relations between the US and North Korea, he had to stand by while Bush spoke out against measures that might strengthen the regime in Pyongyang. On the other hand, he played a key role in settling the crisis after China impounded a US spy plane, and he succeeded in influencing the direction of US policy in the Middle East.
Powell was convinced that the situation inherited from the previous administration left little immediate scope for new peace initiatives. He was reluctant to over-extend himself on a potentially explosive issue and risk compromising his authority. But he did convince Bush to condemn the construction of new Israeli settlements on several occasions. Similarly, in the aftermath of the bombing of a Tel Aviv discotheque on 1 June, he intervened to stop the operation being prepared by Shaul Mofaz, the Israeli Chief of General Staff, which aimed to occupy the Palestinian territories and eliminate Yasser Arafat. Powell then backed the missions by former Senator George Mitchell and CIA director George Tenet. Tenet told Arafat that the White House still saw him as the sole representative of the Palestinian cause although the media and even Israeli ministers had cast doubt on his legitimacy.
After 11 September Powell clearly enjoyed considerable influence inside the executive and, as a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had no reason to be afraid of the traditional rivalry with the Secretary of Defence, nor with the National Security Advisor. Condoleezza Rice is close to Bush and her ability is not in doubt (2), but she recognises Powell's primacy.
Powell was in a position to impose his strategic choices in the aftermath of the attacks. Investigations had identified Bin Laden as the instigator of the failed attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre in 1993 and subsequent bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. Although there was no formal proof, numerous clues implicated him in the 11 September attacks. The US had started trying to pinpoint his strongholds in Afghanistan and neutralise his financial resources long before the attacks. In any conflict it is preferable to "put a face" on the enemy, even though it is known that al-Qaida has a collegial leadership.
The Taliban are so unpopular that everyone wants to see them overthrown while the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was already up in arms. The country would be strategically isolated, provided the support or at least the neutrality of its neighbours could be secured. All the political and military conditions for success appeared to be fulfilled, with no risk of stalemate.
Bush, backed by Vice-President Dick Cheney, took his decision on this basis and Powell set to work. The priority was to win the support of Pakistan by threatening President Pervez Musharraf. There was no doubt there would be widespread criticism within Pakistan, but Musharraf could count on the discipline of the army, police and civil service, encouraged by one or two spectacular changes in the high command. The sooner the Taliban regime was replaced, the less likely unrest might get out of hand. If Musharraf's authority was dented, it might jeopardise the whole operation.
This explains the importance of finding other rear bases, particularly in Tajikistan, close to the territory controlled by the largely Tajik Northern Alliance. Tajikistan, however, is still heavily influenced by Moscow. It has drawn on the support of the Russian army to quell armed opposition by its own Islamist rebels, and Russian border guards still man its frontiers. To avoid being over-dependent on Russia, the US executive decided to deploy other forces in Uzbekistan, a much more independent republic bordering the area inhabited by Afghanistan's Uzbek population, also opposed to the Taliban regime. Of course Washington realises that President Vladimir Putin is offering assistance in exchange for an end to direct encouragement or indirect help for the rebellion in Chechnya and other policies designed to sap Russian positions in Central Asia.
Having secured the commitment of European countries to the anti-terrorist coalition, the US took measures to ensure that the objections of allied governments could not hinder future decisions. During the bombing strikes on Serbia, French president Jacques Chirac had contested the choice of certain targets, notably the television headquarters in Belgrade. The State Department consequently allotted different roles to its potential partners. At the meeting of Nato defence ministers on 26 September, the US envoy made almost no demands. It emerged, however, that British units were already on the ground. The United Kingdom, whose air force has been involved in US raids on Iraq, is a reliable US ally, making no objections and expressing no misgivings. The others are only expected to make a token contribution and supply a little intelligence.
In the Middle East, achieving US strategic objectives demands more care. It is essential to avoid a sudden outbreak of violence and, if possible, move towards a settlement of the region's conflicts. The US started by trying to convince governments in the region to condemn the terror attacks and approve reprisals in Afghanistan. For the time being that is enough. In exchange, it will make no further attacks on Iraq. The US has also exerted considerable pressure on the Israelis and Palestinians to reduce the risk of continuing friction and stop the escalation of violence. Powell proposed these measures and Bush gave the go-ahead.
But there are opponents to this strategy. Afghanistan, they point out, only plays a marginal part in international terrorism. Bin Laden's recruits for al-Qaida come from Arab countries. Most of the terrorist groups opposed to the US are based in these countries, too. Some of them enjoy the support of Arab governments. According to Powell's opponents, this is where the US should be waging and winning the new war. Above all they are afraid that Israeli interests, as perceived by the Israeli government itself, may be sacrificed to the new US strategy. These dissident voices may soon acquire more weight. Their prime objective is Iraq, which must be eliminated as soon as possible to change the overall climate in the Middle East.
But Powell's opponents are in the minority. At the State Department, everyone is in favour of the executive's policy, and only one high-ranking official is against it. At the Pentagon, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld may often appear hesitant, but his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, is clearly the leader of the opposition faction, going so far as openly to advocate an outright attack on Iraq. Day after day, the same idea is aired by senior US newspaper columnists. They draw on deliberate leaks about possible contacts between leaders of the terrorist attacks and the Iraqi secret service, whose involvement has never been proven. They also repeat the ritual accusations that Baghdad is still producing weapons of mass destruction.
The executive's strategy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has attracted the most outspoken opposition. On 1 October Bush spoke out publicly in favour of a Palestinian state. Five days later Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon compared his behaviour to pre-war European governments' attempts to appease Hitler at Munich. The White House replied that such remarks were unacceptable and Sharon's apologies made no difference. Particularly as Washington insiders say that Bush, after his public statement on Palestine, let it be known off the record that he envisaged a division of Jerusalem.
The controversy has continued. The State Department rallied 28 former high-ranking officials and ambassadors, including the former head of the CIA, Richard Helms, and former Under-Secretaries of State Joseph Sisco and Thomas Pickering. They sent an open letter to Bush urging him to maintain US links with Arab and Muslim states throughout what promised to be a long war. But Bush, yielding to pressure from opponents to his strategy, referred to Saddam Hussein as that "evil man". On 12 October New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani abruptly rejected a gift of $10m from a Saudi prince, Walid bin Talal, because he had dared to suggest that the US "should re-examine its policies in the Middle East". The State Department responded that it understood Giuliani's reaction.
Events in the Middle East will obviously be decisive for US strategy. The State Department was quick to ask Arafat to make a show of his authority and prove he could put an end to Palestinian violence. He crushed a demonstration led by Hamas, leaving two dead. In exchange, US diplomats persuaded Sharon to withdraw Israeli forces from the parts of Hebron they were occupying and, more discreetly, to curtail moves to assassinate Palestinian leaders.
With the killing of two more Islamist leaders it seemed likely that US attempts at pacification would fail. On 17 October two ministers, representing far-right parties, resigned from the Sharon government, underlining its fragility. The same day, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine assassinated one of them, Rehavam Zeevi, in retaliation for the killing of its leader, Abu Ali Mustafa, on 27 August. The crisis took a dramatic turn for the worse. Once again, the grand design of drawing all Middle East governments into a coalition against terrorism foundered on the bloody reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
What happens now will depend on the results of the present strategy. It could go astray in Afghanistan if it takes too long to set up a new regime. Every day sees more bombing raids on a country singularly short of military targets. The objective, we are told, is political. According to a source in Washington, "If we want to form a new power base and weaken the Taliban, we cannot reduce the pressure, even for one day" (3). This explains the start of ground operations, designed to prevent Bin Laden from escaping and to shore up the regime in Pakistan.
Even if the Bush administration does successfully conclude its operations in Afghanistan, the war will not stop there. It has already made this clear to the UN Security Council: "We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organisations and states" (4). Contrary to what most observers suggest, the next targets may be in Southeast Asia. Following the recent execution of one of Abu Sayyaf's hostages, the US could well ask the Philippine government to eliminate the rebel group, and provide it with the means to do so. It could act along similar lines in Malaysia, where several terrorist groups are based. In Indonesia it may require the government to counter the rising Islamist tide, which has already demonstrated its opposition to US intervention in Afghanistan and seems likely to gain further popular support. There is clearly still plenty to do.
More immediately, the US will no doubt be asking the Yemeni and Sudanese governments (with which it is now on good terms) to liquidate what remains of the training camps, depots and resources once used by supposedly terrorist groups. Saudi Arabia will prove more problematic. When investigators discovered the true identity of the 11 September hijackers, most were Saudis. In the US, 173 Saudis were arrested following the attacks and, a month later, 54 were still being held. US leaders are in no doubt that senior members of the Saudi regime turned a blind eye to the financial networks that enabled "terrorist groups" to act outside the country, in Afghanistan, Egypt and Algeria, and, with the connivance of western states, in Bosnia and the Caucasus. In exchange, the various groups undertook never to repeat the 1979 revolt in Mecca, which shook the regime to its roots.
The Bush administration no longer intends to put up with Saudi behaviour of this sort. A recent article in the New York Times clearly reflects the official view: "With Riyadh's acquiescence, money and manpower from Saudi Arabia helped create and sustain Osama bin Laden's terrorist organisation. [...] Since Sept 11, Riyadh has refused pleas from Washington to freeze Mr Bin Laden's assets and those of his associates. [...] Riyadh has so far refused to cooperate fully with Washington's investigations of hijacking suspects. [...] Washington's evasions need to cease as well. Pretending that Saudi Arabia is not a source of support for terrorism only invites further trouble" (5).
There are two ways of looking at the problem. Either the Saudi regime simply made things easier for these groups on condition they made no trouble at home. Or they are the nucleus of genuine opposition, contesting the subordination of Saudi interests to US strategic and economic priorities. As such they may be poised to seize one of the lynchpins of US world power.
Having been challenged by a new terrorism, the US is determined to regain control, if only partially, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and even Iraq. It means to eliminate all the political and social forces that pose a violent threat to its interests. This is the war it has decided to wage. Yet however rational and calculated its strategic decisions may seem, it is the random events of battle that will prove decisive. The US has admitted that it may be a long fight. It is counting on victory, but no one can predict the outcome of this adventure.
* Journalist and author, in particular of De Gaulle, Perrin, Paris, 2000
(1) State Department sources.
(2) She is the first person in this position, since Henry Kissinger, to visit Moscow for talks with the Russian head of state.
(3) State Department source.
(4) Statement by the US ambassador to the United Nations, John D Negroponte.
(5) 14 October 2001.